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I. INTRODUCTION
Colorado courts established the no-injury doctrine and prior appropriation
doctrine around the same time, and the General Assembly codified them thereafter. Courts considered the right to change a prior water right as a "stick in the
bundle" of a water right and an important tool for adapting to the changing
needs of water users. The statutes were, and still are, permissive in nature, authorizing changes unless injury is established. If injury is established, the court
may impose terms and conditions on the change to avoid any injurious effects
to vested or conditional water rights.
However, over the past couple decades Colorado courts have departed
from the application of a fact-based, proof-driven no-injury test in change cases.
Courts now apply a two-part test. In 1999 the Colorado Supreme Court established "quantification of historical consumptive use" as an independent test for
change cases. In recent years, the quantification of historical use has risen to
supremacy, often relegating the no-injury standard to an afterthought. While
courts have been eager to quantify historical consumptive use in change cases,
their emphasis on quantification as the touchstone of change cases-when quantification is not necessarily required to prevent injury-is not without consequences and is inconsistent with other important state water policies.
Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass 'n v. Simhpson marks the dividing line between past and present tests.' In Santa Fe TrailRanches,the Colorado Supreme Court articulated the two-part test, expressly adding a historical
consumptive use requirement to the long-standing no-injury requirement in
change cases. Since Santa Fe Trail Ranches, state administrators and courts
have taken historical consumptive use quantification to an extreme, discounting
the role the no-injury test should play when considering changes to water rights.
This article contends that the no-injury test should be front and center in change
proceedings. Courts should apply historical use limitations on the changed right
when necessary to prevent fact-based, demonstrated injury, rather than potential
or theoretical injury.

1. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54, 57-58
(Colo. 1999).
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Applying historical use quantification without restraint threatens senior water rights-the bedrock of Colorado's prior appropriation system-by subjecting
them to proceedings that are not balanced by a strong no-injury test. Quantification, without a showing of on-the-ground injury, deprives senior water rights
owners of flexibility and value. Quantifying water rights, including in "second
generation" change cases, creates a windfall for junior right holders. Under the
guise of protecting "entitlement to stream conditions as the juniors found them
at the time of their appropriation," courts are causing the redistribution of water
rights across the state. Rote quantification of historical consumptive use of preinterstate compact water rights also diminishes Colorado's overall entitlement
to water. Furthermore, the ransacking of senior water rights in change cases
exacerbates the "buy-and-dry" of irrigated agriculture as thirsty cities need to
acquire even more water to compensate for what was left on the trial court floor.
This article explores the above issues in four parts. Part II of this Article
traces the historical origins and application of the no-injury test in case law and
statute. Part III examines the two-part test outlined in Santa Fe TrailRanches.
Part III also reviews recent legislation and statutory changes, which signal some
legislative pushback against the Santa Fe Trail Ranches test. Part IV analyzes
the interaction of the quantification standard with other state water policies. Additionally, we also observe the effects of quantifying historical consumptive use
unbounded by a strong no-injury standard. Last, Part V concludes by urging
the re-adoption of the no-injury standard as the touchstone for analyzing water
rights change cases.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE NO-INJURY TEST
Before the Santa Fe Trail Ranches decision, the no-injury rule was the
standard that courts applied in water rights change cases. The no-injury rule
originated in the nineteenth century alongside the Colorado Doctrine.' While
past courts considered evidence of historical use-such as diversions, return
flows, duty of water, and expansion of use-they applied limitations based on
that historical use only when necessary to prevent injury. It was a means to an
end, not an end in itself.
Nineteenth-century cases detailing the origins of Colorado's no-injury rule
are described below. A discussion of the subsequent development of statutes
and additional case law follows, tracing the evolution of the no-injury rule and
its application.
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE No-INJURY RULE
Before the Colorado General Assembly codified the no-injury rule, courts
outlined its basic tenets in some of the earliest water law cases. Though courts
favored using the term "injury," they also used "detriment" to express the same
principle.' As early as the 1880s, Colorado courts recognized the foundational

2. See Santa Fe Tril Ranches, 990 P.2d at 53-54; see also DAVID SCIORR, THlE
COLORADO DOcTRIN- 30 (2012). David Schorr also argues the stimulating thesis that the prior
appropriation system was grounded in distributive justice principles designed to broaden state
citizens' use of water resources as much as possible. Id. at 4-6.
3. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443,447, 451 (1882).
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role the no-injury standard played ini water rights cases.' In Coffin t. Left Hand
Ditch Co., the Colorado Supreme Court articulated the injury concept as a "detriment" and recognized that this concept was fundamental to the state's system
of prior appropriation: a "'detriment' at the time of diversion could only exist
where the water diverted had been previously appropriated or used; if there had
been no previous appropriation or use thereof, there could be no present injury
or 'detriment."" The Court explained that injury, or "detriment," only existed
within the priority framework of the prior appropriation system.
The Colorado Supreme Court first applied the no-injury rule in a case concerning a change in point of diversion in Sieber v. Fnnk. In Siebet; the Court
permitted a change in point of diversion because "both points of appropriation
were upon the same stream; no change was made in the quantity of water diverted, and no one was injured by the removal; the use and the points of application of such use remained the same."' The Court therefore held that a simple
change of point of diversion on the same streamn, where no other user was injured, was permissible.!
In 1888 the Colorado Supreme Court decided the seminal case Fuller v.
Swan River PlacerMinng Co.' In Fuller, the Court adopted the "Kdd rule"
from California's state courts:
We think that the rule announced in /Kd v. Laird, 'that, in the absence of
injuriousconsequences to others, any change which the party chooses to make
is legal and proper,' is the only rule under which the rights of the prior appropriator can be fully exercised, and his rights, and the rights of all other persons,
fully protected. The right to change, so limited, includes the point of diversion, and place and character of use.
This no-injury rule was foundational to Colorado water law. The Court cited
Fullerin later water cases for that principle."
Notably, in Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that a "prior appropriator of water from a streamn may change the
point of diversion and the place of use without losing his priority, provided the
rights of others are not injuriously affected by the change."'" Sticklerconcerned
a matter of first impression: whether water right owners could convey their water
4.

See id. at 451.

5. Id.
6. See Sieber v. Frink, 2 P. 901, 904 (Colo. 1884); see also GEORGE VRANESH, VRANESH'S
COLORADO WATER LAW 258 (James N. Corbridge & Teresa A. Rice, eds., rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the early history of the no-injury rule).
7. Sieber, 2 P. at 904.
8. Later, the legislature deemed it necessary to establish the "simple change" principle by
statute in response to Burlington Ditch. See infra Section III.D.1.
9. See Fuller v. Swan River Placer Mining Co., 19 P. 836 (Colo. 1888).
10. Id. at 839 (emphasis added).
11. See, e.g., Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313, 316 (Colo. 1891) (quoting
Fuller,19 P. at 839) ("It seems to be well settled by these decisions that a prior appropriator of
water from a stream may change the point of diversion and the place of use, without affecting his
rights of priority, and all the cases reviewed ... make the right to make such change dependent
upon the condition that the change shall not injuriously affect others." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
12. Id. at 314.
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rights separate from the land.'" The Court affirmed that a water right owner had
a "paramount right" to use and transfer a water right to other property "by sale
so long as the rights of others ... are not injuriously affected thereby.""
The Court explained its reasoning in detail, citing Fullerin support of its
holding. 1" In Fuller,the Court held that "one who has the right by appropriation
to divert the waters of a stream may change the place of diversion, and also the
place of use."'" This disposed of the plaintiffs contention in Stncklerthat"water
is only appropriated for a particular tract of land, and that the appropriation will
not hold for any other."" The FullerCourt also found it "well settled" that a
prior appropriator "may change the point of diversion and the place of use,
without affecting his rights of priority... [on] the condition that the change shall
not injuriously affect others."'" The Court found only one case that held otherwise." The Strickler Court concluded its analysis by adopting the rule announced in Kddand Fullerthat,"'in the absence of injurious consequences to
others, any change which the party chooses to make is legal and proper,' is the
onlyrule under which the rights of the prior appropriator can be fully exercised,
and his rights, and the rights of all other persons, fully protected."" The Court
agreed that the right to change a water right included changes to the point of
diversion, place, and character of use.2'
By adopting the Fuller-IDddrule as the "only rule" that fully protects the
rights of appropriators and other persons, the Colorado Supreme Court identified the no-injury rule as a bedrock principle of Colorado's prior appropriation
system. The Court continued by explaining why the rule was beneficial: it promoted flexibility and efficient use of the resource and "seems to be fair to all
parties concerned.""2 For example, "If A. is the owner of 160 acres of land, with
a water-right for only 80 acres, it may be of great benefit to him to change the
place of use as the soil upon a portion of the tract becomes exhausted or impoverished by the raising of crops," resulting in greater beneficial use of the
water right.' If a trial court denied such changes, the Court explained, it would
be harming the applicant without benefitting others. Assuming no injury to
other water rights, an appropriator's right to change the place of use "cannot be
made to depend upon the locus of the use."' Furthermore, "The authority for
changing the place of use from one part of a quarter section of land to another
place upon the same quarter section will permit the purchase of land elsewhere,
and utilizing the water in its cultivation." 6
13.
14.

Id.at 315-16.
Id.at 316.

15.

Id.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting Fuller, 19 P. at 839) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Id.(recognizing contradictory holding in Davis v. Gale, 32 Cal. 27 (1867)).
20. Id.(emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. Id
24. Id.
25. Id.(emphasis in original).
26. Id.
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The early judicial rationale expressed the importance of protecting valuable
senior rights and flexibility to use those prior rights, balanced by protection of
junior rights holders from injury as a result of the change-something that is
absent in recent cases.
B. THE EARLY CODIFICATION OF THE No-INJURY STANDARD AND
APPLICATION

Statutes that governed changes of water rights from 1899 to 1969 continued
to employ the no-injury standard from Fullerand Strickler' The first legislation on changes in points of diversion, Senate Bill 429 in 1899, provided the
framework of the current statutory law: notice to other water users, presentation
of evidence on the injury question, and approval of the change if there is no
injury. 8 It provided, in part, that in the case of changes of points of diversion
the court shall hear evidence to determine "whether or not such change will
injuriously affect the vested rights of others in and to the use of water; and if the
said court shall find that such change will not injuriously affect the rights of others, a decree shall be entered allowing said party to make such change. " '
The legislature expanded upon this language in 1903 when it enacted
House Bill 370, which required courts to include terms and conditions to prevent injury from a change in point of diversion."0 The statute did not require
specific terms and conditions; instead, it gave the courts discretion to impose
the terms and conditions in a way to alleviate the injury demonstrated."
27. See 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613, 629 (enacting S.B. 90, 34th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.);
1903 Colo. Sess. Laws 278, 278-79 (enacting H.B. 370, 14th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.); 1899
Colo. Sess. Laws 235, 235-36 (enacting S.B. 429, 12th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.).
28. See 1899 Colo. Sess. Laws at 235-36.
29. Id. The full quote is as follows:
Every person desirous of changing the point of diversion of his right to use water from
any of the streams of this state, shall present his petition to the district court from which
the original decree issued, praying that such change may be granted to him, and the
practice and procedure on the hearing of such petition shall be the same as if said
petition were for an original decree. The court shall require proof that all parties who
may be affected by such change have been duly notified of the proceeding;, and shall
hear evidence to determine whether or not such change will injuriously affect the vested
rights of others in and to the use of water; and if the said court shall find that such
change will not injuriously affect the rights of others, a decree shall be entered allowing
said party to make such change.
Id.
30. See 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws at 278-79. H.B. 370 stated:
The court shall require proof that all parties who may be affected by the change have
been duly notified in the proceeding, as in the case of an original adjudication, and
shall hear evidence to determine whether such change [in the point of diversion] will
injuriously affect the vested rights of others in and to the use of water, and a decree
shall be entered permititling the change as prayed for, unless it appear that such change
will injuriously affect the vested rights of others; and if such injury appear, the court
shall decree the change only upon such terms and conditions as may be necessary to
prevent such injurious effect, or to protect the parties affected or if impossible to so do,
may deny said application.
Id.
31.

See id.
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Subsequent cases applied the statutes and affinned the no-injury principle.
It should be noted that jurists also used the temis "damage" mad "infringe" to
describe the no-injury or anti-detriment principle regarding changes to water
rights. 2
1. Early Cases Applying the No-Injury Standard
Courts in the first half of the nineteenth century developed the no-injury
standard by approving changes based upon tenns and conditions that prevented
injury to junior water right holders. Quantification of the historical use of the
water right was not mandated, but prevention of injury was required.
i. The Injury StandardisParamount
In City of Telluride v. DavA, two men acted together in constructing a ditch
and making an appropriation. ' Each then applied their respective one-half
share to their separate lands." The water was not held jointly, but separately
and severally.' The Court detennined that the no-injury test applied: because
of the independent ownership of water rights, "there can be no question of the
right of either to change his place of use of the water or the point of its diversion,
if such change does not damage or infringe the right of the other.
The Colorado Supreme Court also confirmed the importance of the no-injury principle in Hassler v. Founain Mutual Irrigation Co., where the Court
declared that this principle was so fundamental to Colorado water law that it
needed no citations!"Y The Court called attention,
in passing, to the principle firmly established in this state that... a water right
may be alienated apart from the land, or its use transferred from one place to
another, or even the character of use changed, provided only that in each instance no injury results to vested rights of other appropriators. We take it that
no citations are necessary in this connection. '
The Court further stated that "water appropriated and decreed may be applied to a larger or smaller acreage, and on a different kind or character of land,
so long as such operation does not divert a larger quantity of water than was
decreed," once again concluding "that authorities need not be cited.""
Ultimately, the Court found no injury to the vested rights of others."
i.The Importance of Terms and Conditions
In Bates v. Hall,the Colorado Supreme Court applied section 2 of the 1903

32. See Lower Lathan Ditch Co. v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 93 P. 483, 484 (Colo. 1907); see
also City of Telluride v.Davis, 80 P. 1051, 1053 (Colo. 1905).
33. City of Telunde, 80 P. at 1052.
34. Id.at 1052-53.
35. Id.at 1053.
36. Id.
37. Hassler v. Fountain Mut. Irrigation Co., 26 P.2d 102, 103 (Colo. 1933).

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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no-injury statute to a case involving a change in point of diversion or place of
use.' The Court found that injury would resultand chastised the lower court's
refusal to impose any temis and conditions preventing injury, despite its own
finding of injury.'" Impotantly, the evidence in the case demonstrated that the
proposed change would result in real-not potential-injury.' Later opinions,
such as San Luis Valley migation Districtv. Knowlton (In re PrioityRights to
Use of Water in Water Disjrict Number 26), continued to describe the noinjury test as "the all important consideration" for water rights change cases."
i. Injuryto Water Rights
Any opposer in a change case must have a vested water right, or since 1969,
a conditional right, that is at risk of injury.' In Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of
Englewood, the applicant proposed a change in point of diversion and a change
in use from irrigation to domestic and municipal.' The objectors claimed injury
on three grounds: (i) "the decree fails to safeguard said protestarits from the
injurious effects of substantial diminution of flow of water in the ditch"; (ii) "the
change of diversion deprives them of the benefits of rotation of use of water in
the ditch"; and, (iii) "the decree does not protect icertaini users against damage
by increased seepage and evaporation losses."" The Colorado Supreme Court
held that the evidence sustained the finding that objectors' vested rights would
not be injured.' It focused on the proximate cause of the injury in its analysis:
The term "injured," as used in the sections of the statute, applies to injury to
the water right of another. It has no application to any damage or injury that
may accrue to another growing out of the fact that he is a tenant in common
of the same conduit with the owner of the water transferred. In other words,
the proximate cause of the injury to appellant is not the change of point of
diversion, or the place of use, but the failure of respondents to longer use the

Soda canal in common with appellant."
In addition, the provisions of the decree at issue "did not concern any
vested right of these objectors and were not ones to which they were legally
entitled.""° Put another way, in order to have standing to obtain a remedy from
a court, the proximate cause of the injury to a vested right must be the change
of the water rights at issue.
41. Bates v. Hall, 98 P. 3, 6-7 (Colo. 1908).
42. Id.at 7.
43. Met
44. San Luis Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Knowlton (In re Priority Rights to Use of Water in
Water Dist. No. 20), 21 P.2d 177, 178 (Colo. 1933).
45. See Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (Colo. 1951), distinguishedbyMetro.Denver Sewage Disposal Dist. v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 499 P.2d
1190, 1193 (Colo.1972) (holding that the rules governing changes in point of diversion do not
apply to changes in point of return of waste water); see also infra note 87 and accompanying text.
46. BrightonDitch Co., 237 P.2d at 118.
47. Id. at 120.
48. Id.at 118-19.
49. Id. at 120-21 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In reJohnson, 300 P. 492, 494 (Idaho 1931)). The court also noted the fact that petitioner and the objectors
were co-tenants in a ditch, not shareholders in a mutual ditch company. Id.
50. Seeid. at l21.
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In City of ColoradoSprings v. Yust, the city petitioned to change its points
of diversion for rights on various tributaries of the Blue River, alleging it would
not injuriously affect other right holders.' Yust, the Colorado River Water
Conservation District, and Clayton Hill protested the city's petition." The trial
court denied the petition and found that the city failed to establish that the
change would not injure the vested rights of others. Demonstrating the importance of evidence in these inherently fact-based change cases, the Colorado
Supreme Court agreed that the only burden of proof on the petitioner is to
answer the injuries that objectors assert, because those objectors are in the best
position to identify the manner in which they may suffer harm."
2. The 1943 Adjudication Act
In 1943 the Colorado General Assembly recodified the statutes using language similar to the change-related provisions in previous statutes.5 For example, the recodified statutes provided for change approval if "the proposed
change will not injuriously affect the vested rights of others," but "if such change
will injuriously affect the vested rights of others then" the court will consider the
petitioner's suggested terms and conditions "to prevent such injurious effect and
to protect the parties affected." Thus, the no-injury standard endured.
3. City of Golden and the Duty of Water
FarmersHighline Canaland Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden concerned a
change in point of diversion and a change from irrigation to municipal use."
The Court found that the evidence supported a finding of injury to junior appropriators if the full amount were transferred." The Court here reasoned that
the burden of proof rested upon the petitioner to show that the change would
not injuriously affect the rights of others from the same source. The Court

51.

City of Colo. Springs v. Yust, 249 P.2d 151, 152 (Colo. 1952).

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id.at 155 (quoting Tanner v. Humphreys, 48 P.2d 488 (Utah 1935)). The court
stated:
The burden of proof on petitioner in such a proceeding requires him to meet only the

grounds of injury to protestants asserted by them. As said by the Utah court, in Tanner
v. Humphreys... "Inan application for a change of diversion, it is not necessary for a
party so applying each time to make a showing that it has beneficially used its water
right. If it has not, then the protestants may so show. It is assumed that where the
water has been used upon the land for which it is diverted, that such amount was beneficially used. It would be impracticable to require the plaintiff to ferret out all of the
ways in which the others might perchance be injured and offer proof in negation thereof
as a part of its affirmative case. The general negative as against injury to the protestants
is sufficient Ito] carry the case over a motion for a nonsuit in that respect."
Id.(citation omitted).
55. See 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613, 629 (enacting S.B. 90, 34th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.).
56. Id.
57. Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 630 (Colo.
1954).

58.
59.

See id.at 633, 636.
Id.at631.
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further stated that "the well-recognized right to change either the point of diversion of the water right or its place of use is always subject to the limitation that
such change shall not injure the rights of subsequent appropriators."' It noted
that a change of water right "may be permitted by proper court decree," but
"only in such instances as it is specifically shown that the rights of other users
from the same source are not injuriously affected by such change, and that the
burden of proof thereof rests upon petitioner."' Furthermore, "these principles have been enunciated by our Court time and again.... land] as we have
repeatedly held... junior appropriators have vested rights in the continuation
of stream conditions." 2
i; Injury to the Shream
The Court in City of Golden considered the trial court's holding that "the
bulk of evidence bearing on the question of supposed injury during the growing
season had to do with injury to Clear Creek generally, rather than with reference
to injury to any particular water right, as appears to be required under the
[Bighton Ditch Co. v. City oil Englewood case."" The Court took issue with
the trial court's decision regarding general versus particular injury to the
stream. ' The trial court "presumed to enter a finding that no injurious effect
would result if the entire amount of the two older priorities . . [werel transferred, and that if any injury did result therefrom, it would be a general injury
and could not affect any of the respondents specifically."' What is more, the
Court considered "the fallacy of such presumption [to be] readily apparent." 6
The Court explained:
When any injury is permitted under the assumption that it is general to the
stream, it immediately becomes clear that such instances multiplied might become very serious. Where general injury would result to the stream by the
transfer, the change could not be authorized without injury to junior appropriators because it is their rights, proportionate with senior rights, that consume
the whole stream. 67
The Court clarified the burden of proof. The vested rights of others "include not only [a]right to diversion of water from the stream in the chronological order of priority, but also the right to maintenance of conditions on the
stream existing at the time of appropriation." However, the burden of proof

60. Id. at 632 (quoting Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co.,
183 P.2d 552, 555 (Colo. 1947)).
61. Id. at 631.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 632 (citing Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116 (Colo. 1951)).
64. Id. 632-33.
65. 1d.at 633.

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.(quoting Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (Colo. 1951)).
In full, the court stated:
It apparently was the impression of the trial court, and is contended by counsel on
behalf of petitioner, that the rules and principles hereinabove discussed were modified
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for showing such injury-that is, proving a change in stream conditions-rests
with the petitioner. 9
ii. The Duty of Water
The Court in City of Golden was concerned that acceptance of such "general" injuries would upset the system." This case planted the first seeds of the
historical consumptive use concept." The Court reasoned that any conditions
and limitations imposed to prevent injury depended on the facts and surrounding circumstances of each particular case."2 Accordingly, trial courts should account for not only the quantity of water the original lands reasonably required
for irrigation and the original return flow, l6ut also the actual consumptive use
and probable return flow. 3 As the Court noted, courts should consider and
account for "all elements of loss to the stream by virtue of the proposed change"
and should insert "appropriate provisions of limitation.. . in[to] the decree as
the facts would seem to warrant" to accomplish the law's purpose of protecting
all appropriators."
In order to protect other water users, a trial court must consider the duty of
water and amount of return flow in change of point of diversion cases.'5 In the
case of a change of a point of diversion or use, "the right is strictly limited to the
extent of former actual usage.""6 Additionally, a court's decree must include
terms and conditions to prevent injury." These conditions serve to counteract
the loss when the desired change will deplete the supply source and injure junior
appropriators." Consequently, a court should deny a change decree only
"where it is impossible to impose reasonable conditions" to prevent injury to

by our decision in the case of Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood.... A careful
study of that opinion will show that, instead of being in relaxation of the foregoing rules,
it is in complete conformity therewith, the holding being specifically that vested rights
of others "include not only right to diversion of water from the stream in the chronological order of priority, but also the right to maintenance of conditions on the stream
existing at the time of appropriation." It is indicated that our Court in the Englewood
case, supra, placed the burden of proof to show injury upon the protestant, but this is
not an accurate impression. We therein held that a protestant must rely upon injury
to himself and not to his neighbor, and that where he claims special damage or injury
accruing particularly to him on account of peculiar surrounding conditions, he must
show those conditions and the manner in which he will be especially affected by the
proposed change; but neither of those issues is presented here. The facts in the Englewood case also were considerably different from the facts in the present case. There,
former changes had been decreed and conditions imposed which carried over into the
Englewood case, and further conditions and limitations were offered by Englewood,
resulting in the trial court finding that no additional conditions were required.
Id. (citation omitted).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 634-35.
72. Id. at 635.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Dry Creek No. 2 Ditch Co. v. Coal Ridge Co., 129 P.2d 292 (Colo. 1942)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 634.
77.- See id. at 635.
78. Id.
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juniors.
4. The Enlargement of Use Doctrine
Appropriators may transfer their water rights to another use as long as the
change in use is limited to actual historical usage. " However, appropriators may
not "enlarge" their appropriations through the change." Specifically, senior appropriators are not entitled to enlarge their water rights by changing them and
then diverting the full amount of the water decreed to the original diversion."
Stated another way, a senior appropriator may not increase the historical use of
a water right-even if historical use is less than the decreed anount. Such an
increase in use may injure other water users; therefore, "a change of water right
must limit the amount of water being changed to the 'same amount historically
diverted through ...the original decreed points of diversion"' to ensure that
other water users are not injured.'
C. THE 1969 WATER RIGHT DETERMINATION AND ADMINISTRATION ACT

In 1969 the legislature created the first incarnation of the modem water
rights statutes by adopting the Water Right Determination and Administration
Act ("Act")." This Act continued to use the longstanding "will not injuriously
affect" and "terms and conditions" language for changes of water rights. " Subsection 148-21-21(4) of the Act provided discretionary exanples of such ternis
and conditions, that "may be included," but these terms were tied to preventing
injury and were not independent elements. " The language of the Act provided
in part as follows:
(3) A change of water right or plan for augmentation, including water exchange
project, shall be approved if such change or plan will not injuriously affect the
owner of or persons entitled to use water under a vested water right or a decreed conditional water right. If it is determined that the proposed change or
plan as presented in the application would cause such injurious effect, the referee or the water judge, as the case may be, shall afford the applicant or applicants or any person opposed to the application an opportunity to propose

terms and conditions which would prevent such injurious effect.
(4)(a) Terms and conditions to prevent injury as specified in subsection (3) 'f
this section may include:
(b) A limitation on the use of the water which is subject to the change, taking
79. Id.
80. See Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 183 P.2d 552,
552-56 (Colo. 1947).
81. Id.at554-55.
82. Id.
83. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54 (Colo. 1999)
(quoting Orr v. Arapahoe Water and Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Colo. 1988)).
84. See 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200 (enacting S.B. 81, 47th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.)
(originally codified as COLO. REV.STAT. § 148-2 1-1 etseq. (1969)); see also COLO. REv. STAT.
§§ 37-92-101 etseq. (2014).
85. See 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1211.
86. Id.
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into consideration the historic use and the flexibility required by annual climatic differences.
(c) The relinquishment of part of the decree for which the change is sought or
the relinquishment of other decrees owvned by the applicant which are used by
the applicant in conjunction with the decree for which the change has been
requested, if necessary to prevent an enlargement upon the historic use or
diminution of return flow to the detriment of other appropriators.
(d) A time limitation on the diversion water for which the change is sought in
terms of months per year.
(e) Such other conditions as may be necessary to protect the vested rights of
others."
It is important to note that these provisions in Subsection 4 provided examples of conditions to prevent injury. In other words, they are permissive and
not mandatory.
After renumbering the section as 37-92-305, the Colorado General Assembly amended subsection (3) of the Act in 1989.8" Senate Bill 166 clarified that,
when a party files a Statement of Opposition, (i) it was the duty of an applicant
to provide proposed terms and conditions to prevent injury, in the form of a
proposed ruling or decree; and (ii) notice would be provided to all parties entering the proceeding-putting the onus of monitoring for threats to one's water
rights on the opposers."
It is also worth noting that, since the 1969 Act, the no-injury standard for
change cases has also protected decreed conditional water rights.' However,
the no-injury standard has otherwise remained substantially similar to the language first used in the early twentieth century.
D. POST-1969 ACT, PRE-SANTA FE TRAIL RANCHESCASE LAV

1. Limitations Based on Historical Use
In Weibert v' Rothe Brothers,Inc., the Court reviewed a decision concerning an anended application that requested a change in point of diversion and
place of use from Well F, an existing well irrigating 130 acres surrounding
Well F, to Well R, a proposed well irrigating 130 acres surrounding Well R."'
Well R was located about thirty miles downstream from Well F."2

87. Id.
88. 1989 Colo. Sess. Laws 1431 (enacting S.B. 166, 57th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.).
89. Id.
90. 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1211; see also Wagner v. Allen (In re Application for Water
Rights of Certain S'holders in Las Animas Consol. Canal Co.), 688 P.2d 1102, 1108 (Colo. 1984)
(quoting COLO REX'. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (1973)) (noting the 1969 Act's no-injury standard's
consideration of decreed conditional rights).
91. Weibertv. Rothe Bros., Inc.,618 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Colo. 1980).
92. Id.
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The water court granted the point of diversion change but limited diversions because it caused changes in return flow patterns.93 The Colorado Supreme Court reversed." The Court determined that the water court erred in
three ways: (i) by ruling that historical use under the original decree was res
judicata and prevented consideration of historical use of Well F; (ii) by refusing
to consider evidence of historical use in determining the adequacy of the augmentation plan; and (iii) by failing to include in the decree a provision regarding
retained jurisdiction on the question of injury to vested rights of others."
The Court held that the right to change a point of diversion or type of use
is limited to the "duty of water."' Moreover, the Court held that the applicant's
historical use of the water. right limited the change right: "The right to change a
point of diversion or place of use is also limited in quantity and time by historical
use. Historical use could be less than the optimum utilization represented by
the 'duty of water' in the instant case because [Well F] could not physically
produce at the decreed rate on a continuing basis."" The Court held that the
water judge erred by holding that res judicata barred any inquiry into historical
use." Despite the earlier adjudication, the Court concluded that the water judge
needed to consider new historical use information when analyzing the proposed
change.'

2. The Burden of Proof of Historical Use
In Wagner v. Allen (In re Application for Water Rights of CertainShareholdersinLasAnimas ConsolidatedCanalCo.), the Court considered who had
the burden of proof regarding historic use in change cases." In this instance,
mutual ditch companies and an electric utility company applied for a change of
water rights, seeking changes in the type, place, and manner of use. ' The Court
approved the change of water rights but remanded with directions to amend the
decree.'°2
With respect to the burden of proof, the Court rejected the objectors' argument that "applicants failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating historic
use because an assumption of pro rata distribution cannot replace evidence of

93.

Id. at 1368-69.

94. Id.
95.

Id. at 1369-70.

96. Id.at 1371.
97. Id. at 1371-72 (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 1372.
99. Id. at 1372-73 ("Often the period and pattern of use are not knowvn with certainty at the
time a water right is adjudicated. We have long recognized that there is read into every decree
awarding priorities the implied limitation that diversions are limited to those sufficient for the
purposes for which the appropriation was made, regardless of the fact that such limitation may
be less than the decreed rate of diversion. It follows that historical use was not in issue in adjudication of the Furrow water right .... It was error to refuse to consider evidence of historical use."
(citations omitted)).
100. 'Wagner v. Allen (In re Application for Water Rights of Certain S'holders in Las Animas
Consol. Canal Co.), 688 P.2d 1102, 1108 (Colo. 1984).

101. Id.at 1103, 1105.
102. Id.at 1103.
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actual consumption..... Here, the applicants successfully relied upon the presumption of pro rata consumption by shareholders to establish the historical
consumption of junior priorities.'4° The Court also found that the applicants
presented reliable evidence showing the methods by which all shareholders had
historically diverted water.' °
The Court looked to the change of water rights statute, Colorado Revised
Statutes section 37-92-305(3), which stated that "[a] change of water right...
shall be approved if such change or plan will not injuriously affect the owner of
or persons entitled to use water under a vested water right or decreed conditional water right."' 6 Citing the statute and case law, the Court also reiterated
that applicants have the burden of proving that their proposed change will not
injure other users.' 7 Once the applicants establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the objectors.'0
3. Foreshadowing Quantification of Historical Consumptive Use
The 1980s saw a greater application of the no-injury standard, but also increased discussion of historical use. For examnple, in Southeastern Colorado
Water Conservancy District v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., the Colorado Supreme
Court addressed the change of storage rights for three reservoirs.' 9 The water
court had found that the transfers of storage rights were legal, provided there
was no injury to the vested rights of others."' The opposers alleged injury, arguing that the change of use of storage rights and storage of direct flow rights
would reduce the amount of return flows available for other.appropriators."'
The Court responded by explaining its previous holding in City of Westminster
v. Church, which held that a "[c]hange of use does not create a greater burden
as to storage water.""' According to the Court in Southeastern:
Westminster also reiterated the rule that an application to change the use or
diversion point of direct-flow rights is strictly limited to the amount of water
actually historically diverted rather than the full amount of the "paper decree."
In Westminster, we used "historical use" to mean the actual amount of water
historically diverted under the decrees."'
Despite mentioning historic diversion and use, the Court still maintained

103.
104.

Id.at1107.
Idat1108.

105. Id. at 1107-08. The Court noted, however, that the case's unique facts, in which mutual
ditch companies and a utility company sought changes of water rights, distinguished it from more
common cases involving indi)idual users and accordingly involved a different burden of proof
based on pro rataownership interests and evidence of actual receipt of water. Id.
106. Id. at 1108 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305.(3) (1973)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Ft. Lyon Canal Co., 720 P.2d 133, 133 (Colo.

1986).
110.
111.
112.

Id.at 139.
Id.at 144.
Id at 144-45 (quoting City of Westminster v. Church, 445 P.2d 52, 58 (1968)).

113. Id at 145 (emphasis in original).
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that courts must reject or modify applications on the basis of injury.'4 In addition, the Court mentioned the quantification of historic water use.'15 The Court
recited that the duty of water and the historical use both limit the right to change
the use or point of diversion of a water right.'" This case foreshadowed the
historical consumptive use concept in later water rights change cases.
In Wagner, as discussed above in subpart D.2, mutual ditch companies and
an electric utility applied for a change of water rights."' The Court held that the
conditions the water court imposed in the decree adequately protected the objectors' from injury."' Specifically, "The objectors arguled] that the decree [did]
not include sufficiently detailed findings concerning historic use of the junior
priorities ....While ie objectors claimed that "the applicants failed to sustain
their burden of demonstrating historic use because an assumption of pro rata
distribution cannot replace evidence of actual consumption," the Court rejected
this argument "in the context of this case."'" The Court stated:
The applicants did present reliable evidence of the various means by which all
shareholders historically received water. Any inability to establish actual shareholder-by-shareholder consumption under the junior priorities resulted from
the fact that no reliable records of such specific consumption are extant. Furthermore, it is not disputed that the objectors at all times actually received at
least the amount of water their pro rataownership interests under the junior
priorities entitled them to receive. 2
Under these particular circumstances, the water court found, and the Court
agreed, that the applicants were entitled to a presumption that the company
shareholders historically used water on the basis of their legal entitlement to
their pro rata share of the company's water right.'"2 The Court therefore held
that the water court appropriately applied the burden-shifting requirements to
find that, by presumption and despite a lack of evidence, the applicants had met
their burden and could change their water rights.
4. Injury is not Potential, but Fact Based
In Thornton v. Bjou igation Co.-the largest successful change of water
rights application that has reached the Colorado Supreme Court-the Court applied the no-injury standard for approval of changes of water rights.'"' The Court
recited that the burden is on the applicant to show that no injury would result
from a proposed change of water right; only if the applicant can make a prima
114. Id.at 146.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing\Veibertv. Rothe Bros., Inc., 618 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Colo. 1980)).
117. Wagner v.Allen (in re Application for Water Rights of Certain S'holders in Las Animas
Consol.Canal Co.), 688 P.2d 1102, 1102 (Colo.1984).
118. Id.at1109.
119. Id.at 1107.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Great W. Sugar Co. v.Jackson Lake Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 681 P.2d 484
(Colo. 1984);Jacobucci v. Dist. Court, 541 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1975)).
123. Id. at ll07-08.
124. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 87-88 (Colo. 1996).
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facie showing of no injury does the burden shift to the objectors to show evidence of injury to existing water rights.'" Additionally, the objector must
demonstrate such injury "by evidential facts and not bypotenziii'es.' " The
Court added that the water court must engage in "a factual inquiry ...to assess
the credibility of competing evidence presented by the parties," and that "[t]he
issue of injurious effect is inherently fact specific and one for which we have
always required factual findings." 7
In Thornton v. Bijou, the Court considered the "floating shares" testimony
of Dan Ault, a water engineer."' Ault testified that "the [Water Supply and
Storage Company] system is a water-short system," and that "complete dry-up
is unnecessary because there will be insufficient water to expand irrigation onto
additional lands."'" The water court accepted this characterization and found
that "dry-up of lands historically associated with the 'floating shares' was not
required to prevent injury.... The Colorado Supreme Court agreed.'3 ' Based
on its review of the record, the Court determined that "sufficient competent
evidence existed to support the water court's determination. '..
Thornton v. Bjou provides two important observations of how the injury
standard and the historical use analysis should be applied. First, both the trial
and appellate courts worried about real injury-not potential injury, not theoretical injury, and not recitations of platitudes such as the oft-misapplied maxim
that juniors are entitled to stream conditions as they found them.'3 Second,
both the trial and appellate courts relied upon evidence of historical use; the
courts were not concerned with actual use of the floating shares on specific parcels and associated dry-up because there was no specific associated parcel.'
Rather, because the owner was a mutual ditch company, the water attributed to
the floating shares irrigated various lands under the ditch.'" Because the ditch
was water-short, removing the shares for the changed use would prevent consumption and hence any injury.1m

mH. SANTA

FE TRAiL RANCHES AND ITS IMPACT

A. SANTA FE TRAIL RANCHES
In 1999 the Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Santa Fe Trail
Ranches PropertyOwners Ass'n v. Simpson.'7 In Santa Fe TrailRanches, the

125. Id. at 88 (citation omitted).
126. Id.(quoting Simpson v. Yale Invs., Inc., 886 P.2d 689, 696 (Colo. 1994)) (emphasis
added).
127. Id.(quoting State Eng'r v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d 496, 508 (Colo. 1993)).
128. Id."Floating shares" refers to those of Thornton's shares not assigned to a particular
farm. Id. at 79.
129. Id.at 88.
130. Id.at 89 (citation omitted).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Seeid. at 88-89.
134. See id.at 87, 89
135. Id.at 87.

136. Id.
at 89.
137. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46 (Colo. 1999).
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applicant sought to change the use of two of its water rights, which the Colorado
Fuel and Iron Company ("CF&I") had previously appropriated and decreed for
manufacturing use. ' CF&I appropriated these water rights on the Purgatoire
River in the 1860s and 1870s to support coke production." CF&I transferred
all of its interest in the water rights to a third party in 1985.'"'
The applicant had an option to purchase these rights; however, the exercise
of the option depended on a successful change of water rights."' So, the applicant sought to change both of CF&I's water rights from manufacturing to a variety of uses."' In no previous change proceeding had a court determined the
historical use of these two water rights."' Because of the lack of information on
historical use, the State and Division Engineers argued that the change might
injure other water users through enlargement.""
Although the water rights were originally decreed for manufacturing use,
the water rights' actual historical use was mixed."' CF&I used some of its appropriations for irrigation-a use that the state water officials never curtailed."'
While CF&I had maintained use records, the records had "disappeared."". In
response, the Santa Fe Trail Ranches opinion articulated a new two-prong test
for change cases.'
It appears that Santa Fe TrailRanchesproves the old adage that "bad facts
make bad law." Here, the applicant attempted to resurrect old manufacturing
water rights that had been applied to irrigation on the opposite side of the river
and to change the rights to a host of other non-specific uses. "
The Santa Fe Trail Ranches opinion expressly added the quantification of
historical consumptive use as the first prong of the test, with the no-injury standard as the second prong:
Contrary to Santa Fe Ranches' contention that a change of use proceeding
focuses only on injury to other water rights, the continuous stream of Colorado
water law demonstrates that change of use involves two prmary quesdons. (1)
What historical beneficialuse has occurred pursuant to the appropriation that
is proposed for change? and (2) What conditions must be imposed on the
change to prevent injuryto other water rights? Only when these questions are
satisfactorily addressed may the water court turn to consideration of the terms
for a decree approving the change of use.
These basic predicates for a change of use have their roots in nineteenth-century water rights law, which provided that: (1) the extent of beneficial use of
the original appropriation limits the amount of water that can be changed to
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another use, and (2) the change must not injure other water rights.'"
The legal basis for the Court's two-prong test was an 1894 treatise.'
The Court outlined its reasoning for applying historical consumptive use
quantification in this case by stating that beneficial use is "the basis, measure,
and limit of the appropriation.'... Then the Court defined "appropriation" and
"beneficial use."'' The key term for describing both definitions, the Court held,
is "lawful"-that is, the appropriation must be made pursuant to the law."'
Next, the Court reiterated that water rights are usufructuary."' The Court
then explained that,
Because beneficial use defines the genesis and maturation of every appropriative water right, we have held that every decree includes an implied limitation
that diversions cannot exceed that which can be used beneficially, and that the
right to change a water right is limited to that amount of water actually used
beneficially pursuant to the decree at the appropriator's place of use.... Thus,
the right to change a point of diversion, or type, place, or time of use, is limited
in quantity by the appropriation's historical use.'
While the result of Santa Fe Trail Ranches is not surprising given the bad
facts presented, the announcement of an independent, additional requirement
in every change case of quantification of historical consumptive use has represented a sea change in change cases. The Court has seemingly relegated the
no-injury rule to an afterthought.
B. POST- SANTA FE TRAIL RANCHES CASES
Post-1999 Colorado case law reflects this decision; rote quantification of
historical consumptive use is now the endgame. Today, water courts apply this
rote quantification analysis in change cases rather than looking at historical use
and including limiting conditions based upon that historical use as a means to
prevent injury when necessary.
1. Where is the injury?
State Engneer v. Bradley (In re Applicalion for Water R'ghts in R16

Grande Countj) is one case that demonstrates the problem of not focusing on
the no-injury standard.
Bradley, the pro se applicant, applied to change the
point of diversion of his well from the corner of his property to the center, and

150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id (citing CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREATiSE ON THE LAW OF I RRIGATION 375 (1894)).
152. Id. (citing Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882); Yunker v. Nichols, 1
Colo. 551,555 (1872)).
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 54.
156. Id. (citing Weibert v. Rothe Bros., Inc., 618 P.2d 1367, 1371-72 (Colo. 1980)) (citation
omitted).
157. See generallyState Eng'r v. Bradley (In re Application for Water Rights in Rio Grande
Cnty.), 53 P.3d 1165 (Colo. 2002).
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to utilize the well with his surface supplies.' The only evidence of potental
injury was that the proposed well "might not affect" the aquifer in the same
way.' The parties presented limited evidence of the historical use.'" Based on
the evidence presented, the trial judge approved the change and found that
there would be no injury.'6' The State and Division Engineers appealed.'62 The
Colorado Supreme Court focused on the fact that there was no "quantifiable
evidence" of the historic use, and reversed.'" The Court explained that actual
historic use is a limit on decreed water rights:
An absolute decree, whether expressed in terms of a flow rate or a volumetric
measurement, is itself not an adjudication of actual historical use but implicitly
is further limited to actual historical use. In order to determine that a requested change of a water right is merely that, and will not amount to an enlargement of the original appropriation, actual historic use must therefore, in
some fashion and to some degree of precision, be quantified. As we have
previously observed, once an appropriator exercises the right to change a decreed water right, he runs the real risk of requantification of the right based
upon actual historic consumptive use at an amount less than his original decree. 161
In Bradley the Court equated "actual historic use" with requantification.'"
Rather than focusing on whether there would be any injury to other water users,
the Court focused on a change of water rights case as an opportunity to recalculate the amount of the water right. Methods of measuring water use to determine historic use and to ensure no enlargement included calculating not only
the acreage under irrigation, but also the duty of water.'" That being said, the
Court stated that, when a water court cannot differentiate between multiple water rights that have contemporaneously irrigated the same land, "calculation of
the productivity and needs of the acreage alone can never be sufficient."'
After this discussion, the Court discussed the requisite no-injury prong.
The Court elevated the Santa Fe Trail Ranches historical use prong over the
no-injury prong. "' The Court stated that
It is well-established that the applicant for a change of water right bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested
change will not injure other users .... Although less expressly articulated, an
obligation to demonstrate that the requested change remains within the scope
of the original right and does not require a new and independent appropriation
is necessarily included within this burden. While the enlargement of a water
right, as measured by historic use, may be injurious to other rights, it also
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simply does not constitute a permissible "change" of an existing right. The
applicant therefore bears the risk of nonpersuasion with regard to historic use
as well as the absence of injury to other rights.... If the record fails to contain
evidence from which both can be favorably resolved, the application must be
denied. 6'
The Court correctly stated that quantification was insufficient without examination of injury. Yet, the application of this two-part test was more extreme.
In Bradley the Court announced two separate and independent burdens
for historic consumptive use and no-injury, which means that an applicant must
establish historic consumptive use of the water rights in question, regardless of
whether there is injury.'70
Subsequently, courts have interpreted Bradleytothe point of nearly reading
no-injury out of change cases. For instance, in Trail's End Ranch, L.L.C. v.
ColoradoDivision of Water Resources, the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
Even when it seems clear that no other rights could be affected solely by a
particular change in the location of diversion, it is essential that the change also
not enlarge an existing right. Because an absolute decree is itself not an adjudication of actual historic use but is implicitly further limited to actual historic
use, in order to insure that a change of water right does not enlarge an existing
appropriation, its "historic beneficial consumptive use" ... must be quantified
and established before a change can be approved."'
2. The Culmination of the Demise of the No-Injury Standard
In 2011 the Colorado Supreme Court published the BurlingtonDitch Reservoir and Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamaton Distnctopinion. '" In
that case, a number of entities sought to change certain water rights from irrigation to municipal use.' 7' Though the Court here endorsed the no-injury standard as "the key principle" underlying Colorado's appropriation system, it stated
that "a change of water right proceeding precipitates quantification based on
actual historical consumptive use, in order to protect other appropriators.'7 .
The multiple proposed changes in use, points of diversion and storage, and
place of use raised the issue of unlawful expansion of water rights.' Because
both the water court and the Colorado Supreme Court agreed that the entities
would thereby unlawfully enlarge their water rights, both courts concluded that
such undecreed enlargements could not be the basis for a change decree.' 6 A
key factor in this decision was the entities' intent to eventually pursue a system-wide quantification of shares; the entities claimed the water court overstepped its jurisdiction by requantifying shares not actually before the water
169. Id. (citations omitted).
170. Seeid.
171. Trail's End Ranch, L.L.C. v. Colo. Div. of Water Res., 91 P.3d 1058, 1063 (Colo. 2004)
(citation omitted).
172. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256
P.3d 645 (Colo. 2011).
173. See idat 653-54.
174. Id. at 674-75 (citation omitted).
175. Id.at 675.
176. Id.
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court, but the Court disagreed.'" The Court reasoned that the water court had
in rem jurisdiction over the water rights "clearly put at issue by the parties'
change applications" and therefore could impose terms and conditions on all
shares and water rights in the ditch.'78
Burlington Ditch represents the culmination of the destruction of senior
water rights that can come from long-practiced but undecreed uses. In the quest
to quantify historical use under the ditch-wide analysis, the court substantially
reduced farmers' water entitlements-that were or still are being used-by limiting the direct right of two hundred cubic-feet per second for use above Barr
Lake and restricting reservoir storage releases from Barr Lake to lands irrigated
prior to 1909."' The case presents a disincentive to seek a ditch-wide analysis,
which the Court has elsewhere deemed preferable.'8
Burlington Ditch also represents the difficult yet practical struggle of water
lawyers and courts trying to divine the answer to the independent test: what was
the lawful historical consumptive use? Here, the Court adopted a study period
from 1885 to 1909. ' Due to the ancient study period, no one still alive would
have personal knowledge about the historical use during this time period, and
records were likely nonexistent, destroyed, or incomplete. Because the study
period ended in 1909, there are few (if any) contemporary aerial photographs
to show irrigated land, records of precipitation and crop production are dubious
if they exist at all, and parties are left to glean and speculate about what happened and why. As former Division One Water Judge Robert Behrman once
observed, "the further back you go, the further from the truth you get.."
The case also penalized the ditch companies by reducing the lawful amount
of water historically diverted at the Burlington Ditch by 9,600 acre-feet for the
Metro Pumps and an additional reduction for the Globeville Project.'83 Both of
these projects were created in response to serious health and safety concerns;
the Metro Pumps for facilitating cleaner disposal of sewage than the old
Northside Plant, and the Globeville Project to protect the neighborhood of
Globeville from a hundred-year flood. ' The case could cause reluctance in
ditch companies to cooperate with other public agencies to address important
health and safety issues.
C. BILLS IN THE 2000s
The Colorado General Assembly included concepts from Santa Fe Trail
Ranches in subsequent legislation and focused on historic consumptive use and
quantification. It amended Colorado Revised Statutes subsections 37-92-305(3)

177.

1d.at675-676.

178. Seeid.
179. Id. at 675.
180. See Ryan M. Donovan et al., One Step Forwardand Two Steps Back: The Prospectsfor
Ditch-Wide Quantitfcations and Alternative Transfer Methods, 17 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
267, 275 (2014) (discussing ditch-wide analysis in detail).
181. Burlington Ditch, 257 P.3d at 665-66.
182. Personal knowledge and observations of the author.
183. BurlingtonDitch, 257 P.3d at 659-60.
184. Id. at 659.
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and (4) in 2006 by adding provisions for crop rotation contracts." In particular,
new subsection 305(4)(a)(IV) expressly addressed "historical consumptive use
limits" for land parcels subject to rotational crop management contracts."' This
new subsection provided that, "to the extent that some or all of the water that is
the subject of the contract is not utilized at a new place of use in a given year,
such water may be utilized on the originally irrigated lands if so provided in the
decree and contract.". 7 To address the fear of non-use in a future requantification, the law provided that the owner "shall not be deemed to reduce the
amount of historical consumptive use that the owner of the water rights has
made of the water rights.' 8
Amended subsection 305(4)(b)(II) added other conditions that may be necessary to protect the vested rights of others. 8 ' Under this subsection, a water
judge "shallmake affirmative findings that the implementation of the rotational
crop management contract . . will neither expand the historical use of the
original water rights nor change the return flow pattern from the historically
irrigated land in a manner that will result in an injurious effect as specified in
subsection (3)."' This provision applies the no-injury standard to other water
rights in the context of rotational crop management contracts.
In 2008 House Bill 1280 amended section 37-92-305(3) to include subsection (b), authorizing the use of the changed rights to improve Colorado Water
Conservation Board ("CWCB") instream flows.'9 ' This bill provided that water
right change decrees concerning instrean programs, "shall provide that ... the
lessor, lender, or donor of the water may bring about beneficial use of the historical consumptive use of the changed water right" as fully consumable water.9
Like other water rights, the change is "subject to such terms and conditions as
the water court deems necessary
9 2 to prevent injury to vested water rights or decreed conditional water rights."
D. PUSHBACK, POST-SANTA FE TRAIL RANCHES IN 2010s

Water users began to push back, through legislative changes, on courts' application of historical use quantification, for fear of being penalized for engaging
in conservation measures and simple changes. A series of recent examples are
discussed below.
1. Simple change in point of diversion
In 2012 the legislature started to chip away at judicially-required historical
use quantification and the onerous results of the Burlington Ditch case. Senate
185. See 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 999, 1000-02 (enacting H.B. 1124, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d
Reg. Sess.).
186. Id. at 1000-01.
187. Id.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 1001-02.
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 587, 589-90 (enacting H.B. 1280, 66th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg.
Sess.).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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Bill 12-097 added subsection 37-92-305(3.5), which permits water rights owners
to apply for a "simple change in a surface point of diversion" where there is no
intervening surface diversion point or instream flow, without having to requantifv tie water right."' If the courts had instead continued to apply the ruling of
the old Sieber case focusing on injury, this legislation would have been unnecessary.
Under SB 97, in a simple point of diversion case an applicant must prove,
"through the imposition of terms and conditions if necessary," that the change
will not: (i) "result in the diversion of a greater flow rate or amount of water
than has been decreed and, without requan6tif4ngthe water right,is physically
and legally available at the diversion point from which a change is being made;"
or, (ii) "injuriously affect the owner of or persons entitled to use water under a
vested water right or a decreed conditional water right."'" If the applicant makes
such a prima facie showing, the proposed change is a "simple change in a surface point of diversion," which is subject to the rebuttable presumption that it
"will not cause an enlargement of the historical use associated with the water
rights being changed."'"
This simple change bill relieved some of the concern of re-quantification
and focused on injury. Such simple changes in surface points of diversion do
not harm other water users by definition. Without intervening streams or water
rights, whether a water right is diverted one foot, one-hundred feet, or one mile
further downstream makes little practical difference. No other water user would
be harmed. However, this is a rebuttable presumption; should another water
rights owner be injured, they are welcome to challenge the proposed change.""
2. Correction to an established, but erroneously described point of diversion
Like the "simple change" law, the Colorado legislature in 2013 set forth, in
detail, the ability of water users to change points of diversion if they were erroneously described in the decree, ' a common reality in this state. To protect
the water user, the new statute created a rebuttable presumption that such
change would not cause enlargement of the historical use and would not cause
injury."' Yet, the legislature went further and expressly established a standard
that "[t] he decree must not requanu'fythe water nghts.."'
3. Protection from reductions in historical use for enrollment in land
conservation programs
In 2013 the state legislature specifically prohibited water judges in Divisions
Four, Five, and Six from considering a decrease in use where

194. 2012 Colo. Sess. Laws 199, 199-201 (enacting H.B. 97, 68th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg.

Sess.).
195. Id. at 199-200 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 199-201.
197. See id.
198. 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 181 (enacting S.B. 78, 69th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess.) (codified
at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(3.6)).
199. Id.at 183.
200. Id. (emphasis added).

WATER LA WREVIEW

Volume 18

(I) The land on which the water from the water right has been historically applied is enrolled under a federal land conservation program; or
(II) The nonuse or decrease in use of the water from the water right by its
owner for a maximum of five years in any consecutive ten-year period as a
result of participation in:
(A) A water conservation program [approved by state or local water authorities];
(B) A water conservation program established through formal written action
or ordinance ...
(C) An approved land fallowing program as provided by law in order to conserve water or to provide for compact compliance; or
(D) A water banking program as provided by law."
These provisions protect water in these programs from later reduction. In
this instance, the Colorado General Assembly adopted a policy of protecting
these water rights from the exacting knife of modem quantification capabilities.
4. The Legacy Ditch Bill
Senate Bill 13-074 (the "Legacy Ditch Bill"), also enacted in 2013, amended
subsection 37-92-305 (4) (a)(I) by adding a subsection (b) to address the concerns
with reverting to ancient study periods, about which no one living would have
personal knowledge, in an attempt to deduce the historical use during those
periods."° It provides that
For purposes of determining lawful historical use ... the lawful maximum
amount of irrigated acreage equals the maximum amount of acreage irrigated
in compliance with all express provisions of the decree during the first fifty
years after entry of the original decree, unless a court... has entered final
judgment to the contrary. Irrigated acreage not exceeding the lawful maximum
amount and located within a reasonable proximity to the ditch . . . as constructed within the first fifty-year period after entry of the original decree, may
be included in the historical average in an historical consumptive use analysis
supporting a change of water right application."'
Like Senate Bill 13-019, the Legacy Ditch Bill protected water rights from
overzealous application of a historical consumptive use analysis by focusing on
the use of the irrigation right during a more representative time.
5. Relocation of ditch in response to floods
In response to the devastating floods in September 2013 along Colorado's
201.

2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 1171, 1171-72 (enacting S.B. 19, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.

Sess.) (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(3)(c)).
202. See 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 372, 372-73 (enacting S.B. 74, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess.).
203. Id.
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Front Range, the Colorado General Assembly enacted House Bill 14-1005."
It amended an ancient self-help statute that allowed water users to relocate a
ditch as a result of the stream changing course.'0' In doing so, the bill expressly
states that the owner relocating a ditch as a result of the stream changing course
"does not need to file a change of water right application," thus relieving the
owner from having to face the risk of re-quantification.'
These recent bills show that legislators, and their constituents, have started
to realize the negative implications that can result from the over-application of
historical consumptive use quantification in change of water rights proceedings.
IV. ANALYSIS: CONSEQUENCES OF SHIFT AWAY FROM FOCUS ON INJURY

The principles discussed above in Section I evolved in the early development of water law in the state, with the keystone being the protection of junior
water rights from injury. One of the oft-cited principles was that junior appropriators are entitled to maintenance of the conditions on the stream when they
made. their respective appropriations." From that premise flowed protective
terms designed to prevent injury, such as replicating return flows in time, location, and amount; seasonal use limitations to prevent a direct flow irrigation
right from diverting through the non-irrigation season; annual and monthly volumetric limitations on the changed right to prevent greater diversion under the
changed right; and so forth."' These conditions are appropriate when necessary
to prevent demonstrated potential injury.
The trend in recent years, however, with the primary focus on quantification of historical use as the primary test, is the diminishing requirement of proof
"how is
of actual injurious effect. As longtime practitioner Jack Ross puts it,
your ox getting gored?""
This Section highlights the need to focus on material injury, not potential
injury to "junior-juniors," as defined in subpart A below. It then focuses on the
consequences, intended or not, of the "carving up" of "senior-senior" rights by
requiring quantification of historical use, outside the lens of injury, to the detriment of other important state policies.
A. SENIOR-SENIORS, SENIOR-JUNIORS, JUNIOR-JUNIORS

Not to be mistaken, juniors need to be protected from real injury. But too
often, and often long after the objecting water users have settled with the applicant, the State and Division Engineers ("Engineers") continue to challenge applicants seeking to change water rights irrespective of injury."' Most often cited
is the rubric of juniors' entitlement to stream conditions as they found them
204. 2014 Colo. Sess. Laws 725 (enacting H.B. 1005, 69th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess.).
205. Id. at 725.
206. Id. at 725-26.
207. See Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1223-24 (Colo. 1988).
208. See, e.g., Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 799,
804, 808 n.6 (Colo. 2001).
209. Statements to witnesses in water court, heard by the author on several occasions.
210. See, e.g., State Eng'r v.Bradley (Inre Application for Water Rights in Rio Grande Cnty.),
53 P.3d 1165, 1167 (Colo. 2002) (involving a pro se party and a case in which the Engineers
intervened and argued that aquifer conditions might be different).
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when they made their appropriation. But what does that really mean? Did
those juniors, especially junior-juniors, really rely upon the stream conditions?
Many of the river basins in Colorado are over-appropriated."' A review of
the South Platte River mainstem call records demonstrates the fallacy of the
rubric of junior-juniors relying upon stream conditions. ' Absent the creation
of augmentation plans in the 1969 Act, "' "junior-junior" water rights, as described using the Appendices discussed below, would not be able to divert at all
except for under free river conditions. For example, in the South Platte Basin
there are "senior-senior" appropriators with appropriation dates of roughly
1860 to 1900 that often control the call during the irrigation season. There are
also "senior-juniors" with appropriation dates of roughly 1900 to 1930 that call
during the irrigation season or that hold storage rights and call in the non-irrigation season; it is this group of water users, and some in the senior-seniors group,
that came to the stream later in time and rely upon uses and return flows from
those senior to them. Finally, there are "junior-juniors" with appropriation
dates of roughly 1930 and later that rarely, if ever, call and can generally divert
only when there is a free river. '
The graph in Appendix A illustrates the Division of Water Resources'
("DWR") call records for the number of times water rights on the mainstem of
the South Platte River placed a call between April 1950 and April 2014. Calls
are labeled by "Administrative Number" on the x-axis (corresponding generally
to dates, with the more senior rights to the left and the more junior rights to the
right on the x-axis). The number of calls placed by each right between April
1950 and April 2014 is indicated on the y-axis."'
The associated table in Appendix B shows DWR Administrative Numbers
and the corresponding appropriation date for each right with the number of
calls per right. A review of these two appendices shows that seniors with rights
from 1860 to 1900 placed over seventy percent of the calls during this period. 6
The DWR data shows no calls by water rights more junior than December 31,
2002 (North Sterling Canal); the most senior calling right dates to November
28, 1860 (City Ditch P1.)." 7 After the 1930s, calling water rights are far less
frequent."' In fact, after the December 31, 1929, water rights (Admin. No.
211. See Upper Eagle Reg'l Water Auth. v. Wolfe, 230 P.3d 1203, 1210 (Colo. 2010).
212. See DWR Calls History, COLORADO.GOv, https://data.colorado.gov/Information
-Sharing/DWR-Calls-History/t7na-sz5k (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (click on the menu button at
the top of the "Water Source Name" column, select "Filter This Column" from the drop-down
menu, scroll down on the list of rivers that appears, and then click on "South Platte River").
213. See generally David F. Jankowski et al., The 1969 Act's Contributionto Local Governmental Water Supp'ers, 3 U. DENv.WATER L. REv. 20, 29 (1999).
214. See infr notes 216, 217.
215. See app. A; see also DWR Calls History, supm note 213 (source of data used to create
graph; sorted to show call records for the South Platte River mainstem). The author exported
call data for the South Platte River mainstem from the website for review. The author only used
data points with an appropriation date listed; there were a number of calls that had no appropriation date listed, or "bypass" calls, and these were excluded from the analysis.
216. See app. B. Senior-seniors made 70.33% of all calls; 96.54% when senior-juniors are
included; and 99.99% including junior-juniors. Id. The reader should note this table reflects
only what was availableon the database and there may be unaccounted for records or calls that
were not included in the DWR's dataset and does not include bypass calls.
217. See id.
218. See id.
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31423.29219 for Jackson Lake, Prewitt Reservoir, Riverside Canal), the next
calling water right's appropriation date is over thirty years younger: 1962 (Denver Foothills P1. 26)."19 This call data reveals thatjunior-junior water rights rarely,
if ever, call. 2 As shown in Appendix B, these junior-junior rights placed only
3.45% of the calls on the South Platte River mainstem"' "bypass" calls excluded, during this sixty-four year study period.
Today, it is a myth that the junior-junior water rights owners could actually
rely upon stream conditions. These juniors-juniors come to the stream knowing
they might divert occasionally under "free river" conditions, but knowing otherwise they need an augmentation plan in order to protect seniors. There is a
limited anount of water in the stream system, of course. Under the guise of
"quantification of historical use," these junior-juniors receive a windfall when
more senior rights are requantified, destroying, or at least diminishing, very senior water rights, which are critical to the existing and evolving use of water in this
state.
'

B. DIMINISHMENT OF PRE-COMPACT WATER RIGHTS

The unnecessary quantification of historical use-that is, doing so without
endeavoring to prevent injury-reduces the anount of water available for use in
Colorado under its interstate compacts. Interstate compacts govern the major
river basins in the state and generally exempt the application of the compact to
water rights that were appropriated prior to their ratification or otherwise protect pre-compact rights in some fashion." '
Each time a court quantifies and requantifies pre-compact rights absent a
showing of actual injury to in-state water users, as the Engineers propose in several ongoing cases for the protection of junior-juniors, 3 it reduces the amount
of water that Colorado is entitled to under its interstate compacts. Continuing
to ratchet down pre-compact rights allocates Colorado's water to post-compact
water rights that are then subject to compact curtailment. As time goes on, this
problem will only be exacerbated, as second-, third-, and fourth-generation

219. See id.
220. See app.A.
221. See app. B.
222. See, e.g., Colorado River Compact (1922), COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 art.7II
(2014) (present perfected rights as of November 24, 1922 are not subject to curtailment); Upper
Colorado River Compact (1948), COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-62-101 art. IV(c) (ights perfected prior
to November 24, 1922 are not subject to curtailment); South Platte River Compact (1923), COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-65-101 art. VI.2 (no curtailment of water rights in Water District 64, senior to
June 14, 1897, to meet a flow of 120 cubic-feet per second at the Balzac gage between April 1
and October 15); Rio Grande River Compact (1938), CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-66-101 art. VII
(protection of pre-1929 storage in Colorado); Arkansas River Compact (1948), COLO. REV. STAr.
§ 37-69-101, art. IV.D (protection of existing uses by prohibiting future development in Colorado
that may materially deplete dse usable quantity of water for state line flows).
223. See, e.g., Opening Brief of the State Engineer and the Division Engineer for Water Division 1 at 45, Wolfe v. Sedalia Water & Sanitation Dist., No. 14SA12 (Colo.filed Apr. 25, 2014)
(in an appeal of a "second-generation" change case initially entered in 1986: "There is no guaxantee junior appropriators coining on the stream during the twenty-four years of nonuse of the
Ball Ditch water right will continue to enjoy their average annual use."); Order Re: Black Hawk
and Coors' Motion for Determination of Questions of Law Concerning Previously Changed Water Rights at 2,In re Application for Water Rights of City of Black Hawk, No. 12CIV303 (Colo.
Water Ct. Div. No. I May 29, 2014).
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changes of pre-compact water rights are re-quantified, without demonstrable evidence showing whether any in-state water rights are actually injured.
C. INCREASING ADDITIONAL "BUY-AND-DRY" OF IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE

After the 2002 drought, Colorado embarked on the State Water Supply
Initiative ("SWSI")."' The latest version of this effort, SWSI 2010, finds that
by 2050 Colorado's population will double to between 8.6 and 10 million people; there will be an unmet demand, or gap, of municipal and industrial needs
between 190,000 and 630,000 acre-feet depending upon the success of Identified Projects and Processes ("IPPs"); and between 500,000 and 700,000 acres
of irrigated agriculture may be dried up due to urbanization and water transfers,
or changes of water rights, to accommodate growing urban delnand." Limiting
"buy-and-dry" of irrigated agriculture through alternative transfer methods is
one of the prime objectives of this state planning effort."6
House Bill 13-1248 created the potential for pilot projects for the leasing
and fallowing of irrigated agricultural lands, as approved by the CWCB;... the
General Assembly affirmed its policy to implement alternative transfer
measures of fallowing-leasing in place of traditional transfers that result in permanent agricultural dry-up. 8 Likewise, Colorado Governor Hickenlooper
mandated that CWCB create a Colorado State Water Plan, and announced
that the "current rate of purchase and transfer of water rights from irrigated
agriculture (also known as 'buy-and dry') is unacceptable.. 9
The consequence of quantifying historical use simply for its own sake, and
not to prevent injury, is that it will require applicants that received less water
than anticipated in a change case to buy more irrigation rights in order to replace
water that was left on the trial court floor. This in turn will intensify the pressure
on irrigated agriculture as municipal users seek to fill their immediate needs for
more water and to fill their future gap in supplies.
For example, one of the strategies municipalities rely upon to meet their
existing and future gaps is to transfer or change irrigation rights, either permanently or through alternative transfer methods. 3' Overzealous quantification of
these irrigation rights will reduce the amount of water these water providers have

224. Sara M. Dunn, Drought Tggers Flood of Legisladon in Colorado, ABA WATER
RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass'n), Aug. 2003, at 7-8.
225. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., STATEWIDE WATER SUPPLY INITIATIVE 2010,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 12, 18, 23 (2010), available athttp://cwcb.state.co.us/water-management/
water-supply-planning/Documents/SWVSI2010/SWSI20OExecutiveSummaryv2.pdf.
226. See Ryan McLane & John Dingess, The Role of Temporar, Changes of WaterRights in
Colorado, 17 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 293, 294 (2014) (discussing various alternative transfer
methods).
227. 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 878, 878-79 (enacting. H.B. 1248, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.

Sess.).
228. See id.
229. Colo. Exec. Order No. D 2013-005 art. II.C (2013).
230. See COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., CDM TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM: 2050
MUNICIPAL AND INDUSTRIAL GAP ANALYSES app. B (2011), available at http://cwcb.state.co.us
/water-mnanagenient/water-supply-planning/Documents/SSI201 0/Appendix%20J_Technical%
20Memormdum%202050%20Mwiicipal%20and%20ldustrial%2OGap%20Analysis.pdf.
A
number of water providers in the state rely upon traditional and alternative transfer methods to
meet their existing and future demands. Id.
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to rely upon, and in turn, cause them to seek to "buy-and-dry" more irrigated
land, either temporarily or permanently.
It is also likely that water providers will implement regional cooperation
and projects to share each others' water supplies and infrastructure to help meet
projected shortfalls in water supply." These regional projects may require
changing the points of diversion or places of use of previously changed water
rights. Water providers are' not likely to pursue regional water projects if the
Engineers' position that requantification of historical use should occur in second generation changes prevails.
D. SECOND GENERATION CHANGES
Colorado's ability to meet the demands of municipal growth, which has
blossomed since World Water II, in large part relies upon a reallocation of
senior irigation water rights through change of water rights cases. 2 As Colorado moves into the twenty-first century and water users "shuffle the deck," we
begin to see what are termed "second generation change cases"-for example,
where a water provider acquires a previously changed water right from another
water user and seeks to change it again,"' or where a water user needs to make
further water rights changes to accommodate new uses at different places or
points of diversion, or in response to events beyond the water user's control."'
In many of these cases, the Engineers have been pressing for a requantification of the historical consumptive use since the first change case, and in doing
so, have been ignoring the preclusive effect of the first change case. Williams
v. Midway Ranches Proper/v OwnersAss'n (In re Applicationfor Water Rights
of Midway Ranches Property Owners' Ass'n) stands for the proposition that
"when historical usage has been quantified for the ditch system by previous
court determination, the yield per share which can be removed for use in an
augmentation plan is not expected to differ from augmentation case to augmentation case, absent a showing of subsequent events which were not previously
addressed by the water court but are germane to the injury inquiry in [this]
case.
231.

See COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., STATE\VIDE WATER SUPPLY INITIATIVE 2010,

at 7-1, 7-14, available athttp://cwcb.state.co.us/water-manageinent/water-supply-planning/
Documents/SWS12010/SWVSI201OSection7.pdf. Collaborative regional planning is a critical element moving forward, as water demand can be transferred from one local area to another.
232. See, e.g., Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1217-22 (Colo.

1988).
233. See, e.g., I reApplication for Water Rights of City of Black Hawk, No. 12CW303, at 6
(Colo. Water Ct. Div. No. 1June 8, 2014) (municipality acquiring changed water rights from
brewving company for its numicipal use); In re Application for Water Rights of Sedalia Water &
Sanitation Dist., No. 10CW261, at 3 (Colo. Water Ct. Div. No. 1 Dec. 10, 2014) (water and
sanitation district acquiring changed water rights from concrete company for municipal use), appealed,No. 14SA12 (Colo.argued Nov. 5, 2014).
234. See, e.g., in reApplication for Water Right of Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., No.
02CW403, at 33 (Colo. Water Ct. Div. No. 1 May 11, 2009) (ditch company moving point of
diversion to protect neighborhood from flooding); hi re Application for Water Rights of the City
of Thornton, No. 2011 CW74, at 7 (Colo. Water Ct. Div. No. 1 Dec. 14, 2012) (municipality
changing decreed point of return flows based on wastewater treatment plant relocating and changing the discharge point).
235. Williams v. Midway Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n (In reApplication for Water Rights of
Midway Ranches Prop. Owners' Ass'n), 938 P.2d 515, 526 (Colo. 1997).
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The Engineers argue that the mere passage of time is a "changed circumstance" that requires re-quantification. In doing so, the Engineers assert that
juniors are entitled to conditions on the stream at the time of their appropria-

tions. In In re Application for Water Rights of Sedalia Water and Sanitation
Distict,a prior change occurred in 1986, but the Engineers asserted protections
for the junior-juniors.' There was not a shred of evidence that juniors were
injured; in fact, the junior water users (that participated in the case) all stipulated
over the proposed thirteen-acre-foot change. 3 ' As noted above, in recent years
junior-juniors came to the stream knowing that they would likely only divert
during free river or if they had an augmentation plan. As to the prior change,
they came to the stream knowing that the prior change had removed the consumptive use from the stream and it was not part of the water lawfully available.
E. CONSEQUENCE OF INSECURITY AND ADDITIONAL COST IN MEETING
PRESENT AND FUTURE GAPS

Growing backlash against the rote quantification of historical consumptive
use is apparent in the simple change and correction of erroneously described
point of diversion statutes and the Legacy Ditch Bill."2 These are mere bandages on the problem. Municipal water users currently are afraid to go to water
court to change their acquired senior water rights. ' Water users with existing
water rights fear subjecting their decreed changed rights to further modifications
because of the risk of requanfification based on post-original-change study periods."t2 The current state of change cases in water court is like running a gauntlet
through land mines with a guillotine waiting at the end.
One of the hallmarks of Colorado's prior appropriation system has been
its flexibility and adaptability to allow changes of senior water rights to accommodate new uses while retaining the seniority to provide a firm supply, especially in times of drought. In the past, this has been a real benefit to municipal
water users. ' Water providers should be able to rely on the security obtained
from a decree as they meet the daunting task of supplying safe drinking water
to their citizens. Responsible water providers are generally not in the business
of ransacking other water users' water supplies in change cases. Rather, those
responsible water providers are interested in protecting their own portfolios of
water rights from injury in change cases. Yet, when others seek to improve their
position and obtain a windfall or quantify historical use without a fact-based
showing of injury, the system is broken and in need of readjustment. There is
no longer any security or reliability to Colorado's system of water law.
The cost of acquiring senior water rights is staggering. Firn consumptive
236. See Opening Brief of the State Engineer and the Division Engineer for Water Division
I at 2, 8-10, Wolfe v. Sedalia Water & Sanitation Dist., No. 14SA12 (Colo. tiled Apr. 25, 2014);
see aso Order Re: Sedalia's Motion for Summary Judgment and the State and Division Engineer's Cross Motion for SummaryJudgment, In re Application for Water Rights of Sedalia \Vater and Sanitation District, No. 10CV261 (Colo. Water Ct. Div. No. 1 Nov. 24, 2013).
237. See Opening Brief of the State Engineer, supra note 237, at 2, 4, 8-10.
238. See supra Section III.D.
239. Personal communications by the author ith a number of large and small water providers.
240. Id.
241. SeeJankowski et a., supra note 214, at 26-27.
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use water on the South Platte can fetch anywhere from $10,000 to $100,000 per
acre-foot depending upon location, seniority, amount, and other factors." ' The
value realized to both the seller and the buyer is substantially decreased if the
right is severely limited through its quantification without attendant injury. Acquiring and changing water rights is, and will continue to be, an expensive proposition; furthermore, needlessly subjecting senior water rights to quantification
and re-quantification for its own sake, without a showing of real injury, results
in an economic re-distribution of the value of those senior water rights to junior
appropriators. This runs counter to the pillars of Colorado's long-standing priority system in which senior water rights holders have a clear legal advantage
over juniors. It is also inconsistent with the state policy of protecting pre-compact water rights and of reducing the "buy-and-dry" of irrigated agriculture.
V. CONCLUSION: COURTS SHOULD RETURN TO NO-INJURY AS THE
ANALYTICAL TOUCHSTONE IN WATER RIGHTS CHANGE CASES
The thesis of this article is not radical or revolutionary. It is simple: return
to the application of the no-injury standard as the cornerstone of change cases.
In accordance with existing case law and statutes, the courts should require a
demonstration of real, material injury_ to other vested and conditional water
rights-not potentialities. Overall, case law and statutes require examination of
historical use though the lens of preventing injury as set out in the 1969 Act,
rather than as an independent test that courts use to eviscerate valuable precompact, senior water rights.
The no-injury standard and its application of historical use considerations
evolved during a time when senior-juniors' water supply was based upon the
return flows from senior-seniors. The no-injury standard has recently devolved
to the point of being forgotten, crowded out and nearly replaced by the fully
independent standard of quantification of historical consumptive use. It is time
to resuscitate the no-injury standard as the touchstone analysis in change cases,
especially as Colorado moves to provide supplies to meet the current and future
water supply gap and to protect invaluable pre-compact water rights.
That being said, there are a few modest legislative tweaks that could help
ensure courts apply the no-injury rule to protect the holders of water rights (i.e.,
those with standing) as the essential element in a change of water right:
*

Amending Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-305 concerning
standards in change proceedings to provide that if the historical consumptive use of a water right was determined in a prior change, that
it must not be re-quantified in a subsequent change case of that same
water right (similar to the additions of subsections 3.5 and 3.6);

"

Amending Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-302(1)(b): "Any
person with standing, includ-ng the ctate engineer, who wishes to oppose...;

"

Amending Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-302(4): "The water judge may request a written report from the state engineer limited

242. Personal communications by the author with water providers and brokers, and personal
knowledge.
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to issues of administration of the decree if the water judge desires";

243.

"

Amending Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-304(2): "any person with standing, including the state engineer, who wishes to protest..."

*

Amending Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-304(3): "The division engineer shall appear to furnish pertinent information limited
to issues of administration of the decree.. ." and "Any person with
standing may move to intervene. .."2

CoLo. REv. STAT. S§ 37-92-302(1)(b), (4), 37-92-304(2), (3), 37-92-305 (2014). Bold text

indicates an addition to tie statute, strikethrough indicates a deletion.
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VI. APPENDIX A
NUMBER OF CALLS BY WATER ADMINISTRATION NUMBER ON THE SOUTH
PLATTE RIVER MAINSTEM: RIVER MAIN STREAM: APRIL 1950-APRIL 2014*
*
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VII. APPENDIX B
DWR Call Historyfor the South PlatteRiver Malnstem: Calls from April 1950 to April 2014
Water Right Corresponding
Number of Total No. of Percentage Cumulative %
of Total Calls
Admin. No.
Appropriation
Times
Calls by
of Total
Called
Decade
Calls (%)
Date
3985
11/28/1860
1
5
4260
8/30/1861
6
4352
11/30/1861
4717
11/30/1862
1
5083
12/1/1863
3
5112
12/30/1863
19
4/1/1864
2
5205
5478
12/30/1864
2
5/1/1865
35
5600
11/20/1865
6
5803
5843
12/30/1865
3
5/1/1866
20
5965
5/3/1866
10
5967
5/5/1866
31
5969
3
6637
3/3/1868
6.53
4/20/1868
1
148
6.53
6685
7659
12/20/1870
2
7671
1/1/1871
1
39
7892
8/10/1871
119
7948
10/5/1871
23
7975
11/1/1871
8157
5/1/1872
1
4
8218
7/1/1972
8501
4/10/1873
3
8511
4/20/1873
1
8597
7/15/1873
4
8659
9/15/1873
31
8661
9/17/1873
5
8670
9/26/1873
1
8689
10/15/1873
31
4/10/1874
1
8866
11/5/1874
5
9075
12/12/1874
10
9112
12/31/1874
1
9131
5/1/1875
2
9252
4
9327
7/15/1875
1/1/1876
5
9497
3
9542
2/15/1877
9597
4/10/1876
1
102
9686
7/8/1876
9821
11/20/1876
51
69
10180
11/14/1877
10215
12/19/1877
8
4
10480
9/10/1878
10610
1/18/1879
29
5
565
24.93
31.46
10901
11/5/1879
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D W Cal Historyfor the South Platte River Mainstem: Calls from Apnl 1950 to April2014
Percentage
Cumulative %
Number of
Total No. of
Water Right
Corresponding
of Total Calls
Times
Calls by
of Total
Admin. No.
Appropriation
Calls (%)
Called
Decade
Date
2
11049
4/1/1880
6/30/1880
4
11139
10/20/1880
8
11251
1/15/1881
15
11338
17
11620
10/24/1881
10/26/1881
28
11622
11/2/1881
1
11629
1
4/26/1882
11804
3
11807
4/29/1882
2
11859
6/20/1882
70
11861
6/22/1882
9
11935
9/4/1882
24
11975
10/14/1882
64
11979
10/18/1882
5
12164
4/21/1883
18
12327
10/1/1883
12470
NA - bypass
1638
calls
12516
4/7/1884
11
12924
5/20/1885
2
13108
11/20/1885
183
78
13349
7/19/1886
59
13985
4/15/1888
112
14154
10/1/1888
3
14185
11/1/1888
31.99
63.45
6
725
14519
10/1/1889
14731
5/1/1890
2
15585
9/1/1892
8
15598
9/14/1892
2
76
16554
4/28/1895
17332
6/14/1897
24
17846.14905
10/22/1890
2
17846.15269
10/21/1891
1
12
17846.16496
3/1/1895
156
6.88
70.33
5/1/1899
29
18018
3
18687
3/1/1901
4
18765
5/18/1901
2
19009
1/17/1902
3
19055
3/4/1902
4/1/1902
3
19083
20
19765
2/12/1904
1
20226
5/31/1907
69
20969
5/31/1907
21031
8/1/1907
25
21150
11/28/1907
6
17
21252
3/9/1908
23
21350
6/15/1908
103
21562
1/3/1909
1
21564
1/15/1909
6
21698
5/29/1909
7
25050.21709
6/9/1909
83.3
1
294
12.97
21709
6/9/1909
36
22059
5/25/1910

WA TER LA WREVIEW

Volume 18

DWR Call Historyfor the South PlatteRiver Mainstem: Callsfrom Apil1950 to Apnl 2014
Water Right
Admin. No.
22212
22239
22254
22355
22370
26302.23522
26302.23953
31423.29219
47481.40987
41776
44706
44723
45364
45804
46114
47847.46567
46590
46748
48974
49826
49841
50403.49841
50466
52960.52699
53454
53558
55882.53771
55882
Total

Corresponding
Appropriation
Date
10/25/1910
11/21/1910
12/6/1910
3/17/1911
4/1/1911
5/27/1914
8/1/1915
12/31/1929
3/21/1962
5/18/1964
12/31/1971
6/12/1972
3/15/1974
5/29/1975
4/3/1976
6/30/1977
7/23/1977
12/28/1977
2/1/1984
6/2/1986
6/17/1986
6/17/1986
3/3/1988
4/14/1994
5/8/1996
8/20/1996
3/21/1997
12/31/2002

Number of
Times
Called
3
8
61
10
30
27
38
87
2
1
4
8
2
2
1
6
2
28
1
1
2
1
2
1
8
1
1
4

Total No. of
Calls by
Decade

Percentage
of Total
Calls (96)

Cumulative %
of Total Calls

213
87

9.40
3.84

92.7
96.54

3

0.13

96.67

53

2.34

99.01

7

0.31

99.32

11
4
2266

0.49
0.18
100.00

99.81
99.99
99.99

